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SUMMARY
This paper analyses the issue of the place of the female informal religious practitioners 
termed bibi otun/bibi khalifa1 within the social landscape of Tajikistan. These women 
play the role of spiritual leaders primarily among the female part of the traditionally 
sedentary population of Central Asia.2 Otuns deal with a variety of issues related to 
spiritual life, teaching children and women religion, and performing rituals and prayers 
for the female part of the community. They are trained in Arabic as well as Islamic 
texts. Sometimes otuns, apart from religious activities, assist women in various social 
matters. In spite of the widespread opinion about the subordinate role of women in 
Central Asia, otuns have a high social status as religious authorities, and their informal 
influences often go beyond just the women’s domain. Dynamic and continual changes 
within the social and political life in Tajikistan have also left their mark on the place 
and role of these religious practitioners.
1 For the reason that terminology used in this paper originated from Persian, Tajik, Uzbek, 
and Arabic languages, I applied the simplified transliteration into the Latin alphabet; for the Rus-
sian words, I used transliteration created for the passport system of 2013 with some modification 
such as the Russian: ‘ц’ is written ‘c’ not ‘ts’; also the names of authors which were transferred 
from the Cyrylic alphabet into the Latin alphabet in the papers and books, to which I referred, 
I left in the original version.
2 This refers to the traditionally sedentary population of Central Asia, meaning those groups 
which led a sedentary way of life before the Communist Revolution (Tajiks and those Uzbeks 
who are no longer identified on the basis of former tribal divisions [to differentiate from Uzbeks 
who have preserved a tribal system]).
Anna Cieślewska130
INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the function of the female religious figures termed bibi 
otun3 in Tajik society. Despite the common view that the participation of wom-
en in the lives of these communities is minor, female religious authorities are 
important social actors. Due to the special status of spiritual and religious 
leaders in Tajik society, female spiritual authorities enjoy a prestigious posi-
tion among the people and they wield considerable influence among the female 
part of the community. Their activities are deeply rooted in the traditional prac-
tices of communal life through performing life-cycle rituals and celebrations. 
Dynamic and continual changes within the social and political life in Tajikistan 
have also impacted the place and role held by these religious practitioners. 
The main purpose of this paper is to present the various aspects related to 
the role of female religious professionals. It also analyses various theoretical 
issues regarding the origin and history of otuns, and the contemporary changes 
within Islam in Tajikistan.
The idea for a project regarding female religious authorities in Central Asia 
was developed over several years of conducting my academic research and 
working for the NGO sector in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. During this time, 
I had the opportunity to participate in religious education classes for women, 
various rituals, as well as to meet with female religious authorities. Altogether, 
the collected material resulted in a research project entitled: ‘The social role of 
women religious authorities in Central Asia in Fergana Valley (Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan)’, which is being presently conducted in the city of Khujand and 
its surroundings, as well as partly in Isfara district, in Tajikistan.4 
Since research is still underway, only some preliminary findings have been 
presented in this article. The research methodology is based on participant 
observation and in-depth interviews. Due to the specific nature of this study, 
many meetings were of an informal character, hence they differ from the stand-
ard form of interviews. Additionally, ethnographic material has been collected 
from a variety of rituals which I was able to observe. Due to the increasing 
tension and pressure surrounding religious issues in Tajikistan, the real names 
of the people with whom I conducted the interviews, as well as the exact loca-
tion of the research, have not been disclosed. 
3 In Farsi/Tajiki, bibi means grandmother/aunt/Mrs; the term is used in relation to respect-
able persons. Other forms include bibi khalifa/halfa/holpa, oy (u) bibi mullo, otyncha, etc.
4 The project is funded by the National Science Centre within the framework of the post-
doctoral fellowship ‘Fuga 2’, decision number EC-2013/08/S/HS1/00205.
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ISLAMIC LEADERS IN CENTRAL ASIA
First of all, in order to provide a satisfactory answer about the role of female 
religious leaders, the place of religious authorities in the traditionally seden-
tary population of Central Asia should be identified in relation to their function 
within the sphere of the state as well as in daily practices and traditions. Prior 
to the Communist Revolution, the authority of religious leaders in Central Asia 
was very strong on each social level, and the leaders were divided accord-
ing to a specific hierarchy. The categorization of the official clergy5 included 
the high-ranked ulama (well-educated theologians), such as lawyers (qadi) 
and teachers (mudarris) in well-known madrasas, muftis, imams, etc. Among 
religious professionals of lesser importance one could list ordinary mullas, 
sufi (sufis, muezzins), and other clerics serving in small mosques, performing 
different duties connected with religious services. There were also the ishans 
(Tajik/Persian: they), spiritual leaders, and their followers who belonged to 
various Sufi brotherhoods and who functioned in various religious centers 
and mosques. Despite their different functions, religious professionals were 
granted a high level of prestige in society since their activities were legiti-
mized by Islamic law originating in the Quran and the Sunna, i.e. indisput-
able sources of knowledge for every Muslim. Sufi leaders were especially 
considered to have a direct connection with God through performing various 
spiritual practices, many of which originated from the pre-Islamic period. 
Furthermore, there were ‘spiritual professionals’ who were believed to have 
possessed the gift of special powers that are not even available to many well-
educated ulama. Because of their supernatural abilities, they enjoy great re-
spect, irrespective of their age, gender or family origin. This group includes 
shamans, healers, and clairvoyants. 
It should be noted that while formulating the principles of the Hanafi school 
(8th–9th CE) in Central Asia – the dominant school of Islamic law in the region, 
the state system was developed by adapting elements of sharia and pre-Islamic 
customs. In many cases, Islamic theologians sought legitimization for incorpo-
rating local practices into Islamic law absorbing various elements originating 
from Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Shamanism, as well as Shia Islam.
5 In Sunni Islam, there is no official hierarchy among various spiritual and religious prac-
titioners so the word ‘clergy’ is not entirely accurate. In Arabic, the word rijal ad-din is used to 
describe a group of Islamic religious professionals. In Shi’a Islam, the clergy is described by 
the term ruhoniyat (Persian: ruhāniyat). 
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ORIGIN OF FEMALE RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES 
The practice of separation into male and female worlds originated in the pre-
Islamic period and was adapted by Islam in the first stage of its development. 
As a result, this developed into specific institutions and rituals in many parts of 
the Islamic world. It also caused the need to create a separate education system 
for women. In the case of the sedentary population of Central Asia, this sepa-
ration applies to almost all aspects of life, including the way of constructing 
houses, which were traditionally divided into a family part [only for women 
and children (Ichkari)], and a front space open to guests [men (Tashkari)]. In 
most cases, women are also excluded from public life and formal decision-
making in a community. Moreover, customary law prevents women from at-
tending the mosque; they are allowed to pray at home. In consequence, women 
have created a separate world with their own traditions and rules, including 
religious institutions, rituals and practices (Sultanova 2011, pp. 122–125).6
It remains unresolved when exactly women began to play the role of re-
ligious authorities for the female part of the Muslim community in Central 
Asia. Many sources confirm that women have played the role of religious 
leaders since the beginnings of Islam. Narratives regarding religious matters 
and hadiths were transmitted by women from the family of Prophet Muham-
mad as well as by his female associates. The first full version of the Quran was 
given for safe-keeping to Caliph Umar’s daughter – Hafsah bint ’Umar. Until 
the sixteenth century, in various parts of the Islamic world, a considerable num-
ber of female religious authorities dealt with the interpretation and transmis-
sion of hadiths, issuing fatwas and teaching. Women who have passed hadiths 
are termed Muhaddithat; many of them have been authorized to issue ijazahs 
(Persian: ejāze), (a type of certificate confirming that the person concerned is 
entitled to transmit certain elements of theological knowledge) (Nadwi 2013, 
p. 16, 18–34, 58–108, 271–272; Sayeed 2011, pp. 97–101). Accordingly, in 
Khorasan and Transoxania, there were many women involved in the study of 
hadiths and teaching (Nadwi 2013, pp. 271–272).
6 The Central Asian tradition of women not being able to enter a mosque is controversial 
from the point of view of classical Islamic thought and the Quran; however, it is customarily 
legitimized by some Islamic scholars. Currently, the custom has provoked vivid discussions 
and much controversy, not only in Tajikistan but also in the other countries of the region, and 
worldwide. In 2004, the Tajik Council of Ulama issued a fatwa prohibiting women from at-
tending mosque, saying that there is a lack of space for men and women to pray separately, but 
some argued it was due to government concern that women would participate in banned Islamic 
groups, such as Hizb at-Tahrir.
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Various verses of the Quran suggest that both women and men should ac-
quire theological knowledge. Some classical scholars believe that the Holy 
Book encourages the study of secular subjects, such as astronomy, medicine, 
biology, literature, and the arts. These could be studied by selected members 
of a community (irrespective of gender) for the mutual benefit of all and is 
considered a communal obligation (fard kifaya), (Sayeed 2011, p. 95). 
Due to gender separation, in many parts of the Islamic world, women de-
veloped their own religious institutions. Within the Hanafi school, female re-
ligious figures have operated in Turkey and Bulgaria (khojas or khocas), in 
Bosnian (bula) (Peshkova 2009, p. 10, see Kijewska 2012); as well as among 
the Chinese Muslims of the Hui minority, and amidst the Tatars in Russia. In 
China, there are separate mosques only for women (qingzhen nusi), where fe-
male religious authorities – ahong7 – lead prayers, teach religion, and provide 
a variety of services to women. With a history of over two hundred years, qing-
zhen nusi are unique within Islam around the world in terms of their autonomy 
from men’s mosques (see Jingjun 2001). Among the Tatars in Russia, there are 
women spiritual figures – abystai – mostly older women who possess a sound 
knowledge of traditions, customs, rituals, while also teaching religion to wom-
en and children. These women are held in high esteem by their communities 
(see Micinski 2012). One of the most famous abystais was Mukhlisa Bubi, 
a teacher, religious authority and social activist. A few years after the revolu-
tion, she served as qadi (judge) in the Central Spiritual Muslim Board, which 
is exceptional in the Islamic world (Makhmutova 2005, pp. 156–171). 
Women have also functioned as Sufi leaders, because baraka (blessing) can be 
passed equally to both sons and daughters. Since Sufi knowledge is considered to 
be based more on spiritual experience rather than on dogmatically-shaped rules, 
even if women were excluded from formal scholarship centers, they have still 
been able to conduct religious rituals for women (Kalmbach 2012, pp. 10, 16). 
Sultanova indicates that women have always actively participated in Sufi 
movements in Central Asia, which is also associated with the tradition of story-
telling, poetry and educational narratives performed in the courts of rulers of 
the past (2011: 43–59). Women were involved in the Sufi sisterhood, perform-
ing various rituals (see Troickaia 1928). There are a number of mazars around 
Central Asia where women ‘saints’ are buried. These places have become 
the destinations for women’s pilgrimages. 
7 Ahong is a term of Persian origin (ākhund) used among Muslims in China to describe 
women and men who are religious professionals operating within the mosque-network (Jingjun 
2001, p. 118).
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Kramer points out that in the past well-educated women with poetic skills 
were called atun, and the first famous poetess was Haiat-atum (Bibi-ātum) at 
the court of the Uzbek Khan Ubajd Allah. Later, in the nineteenth century, otuns 
were known for their activities related to the education of girls (schools of ātum 
-bibi). These otuns were often the daughters or wives of religious authorities, 
people from significant families. In their schools, the curriculum was similar to 
the program implemented in maktabs for boys. The traditional system of Islamic 
education which included separate schools for girls was strongly criticized by 
the Tsarist administration and by the Jaddids (reformers)8 as it was considered to 
be backward and not responding to the needs of the modern world (Kramer 2006, 
pp. 321–322). Despite doubts about the level of teaching, otuns were important 
sources of knowledge regarding adab9 for girls. Religious education was essential 
from the point of view of learning religious, social and ethical norms which con-
stituted the basis of a good upbringing. It was of great importance for a woman’s 
future marriage, the skills she needed in order to raise her children, and for her 
overall culture. To some extent, the situation has remained the same to this day. 
In the aftermath of the Communist revolution, the schools of the atum-bibi were 
closed and the activity of otuns banned; nevertheless, as in the case of the oth-
er religious authorities, they were still active among the population. It should, 
however, be remembered that the primary target of religious persecution were 
the official clergy, while the otun – whose status was unofficial – were only to 
a certain degree exposed to the control of the authorities (Peshkova 2009, p. 11).
Kandyoti and Azimova indicate that some of the otuns were the daughters of 
party representatives, who at the same time belonged to the families of religious 
authorities (2004: 331). For instance, in the village of M., not far from Khujand, 
where there is a famous mazar guarded by a big social group of ishons who claim 
to be the descendants of the saint buried there, the religious leaders (including 
otuns) were active religiously throughout the whole Soviet period since they were 
under the protection of those members of the group who held high-level posts in 
the Kolkhoz hierarchy and the Party (Cieślewska 2014, p. 14).10 
Otuns played an important role in preserving Islamic tradition during 
communism. While men were more frequently involved in work outside 
 8 The Jaddids were Muslim reformers from the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the Rus-
sian Tsarist Empire. 
 9 The Arabic term adab signifies a habit, hereditary norm of conduct, or a custom derived 
from one’s ancestors and other respected people who passed it on as a model of behavior (Ga-
brieli 1986, pp. 175–176).
10 This information is based on the ethnographic material I gathered in 2012, not far from 
Khujand City. 
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the community and were exposed to external influences including atheization, 
women tended to stay at home. Hence, they led a more traditional way of life, 
practicing the old customs and passing this knowledge on to children. Most of 
the female-related religious activities were conducted by otuns, who were an 
important channel of religious knowledge and practice for the local population 
(see Peshkova 2009, p. 12, Kandyoti and Azimova 2004, p. 331).
FEMALE RELIGIOUS PROFESSIONALS IN POST-
SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA 
Today, otuns still deal with religious matters and rituals, and they also teach 
religion to children and women. Otuns perform prayers and rituals for women 
during different community celebrations, such as hayiit in the months of Rama-
dan and Muharram, mavlud (the birth day of Prophet Muhammad),11 weddings, 
funerals, etc. Frequently, otuns duplicate the prayers carried out by the mulla in 
mosques or by men at home; but they do not lead prayers like an imam – stand-
ing in front of the faithful, but rather they pray together with all the women in 
the first row. Sometimes, they also lead pilgrimages to mazars.12 Furthermore, 
they perform rituals, specifically for the development of women’s spiritual 
life (such as Mushkil-kushod,13 Bibi-seshanbe,14 etc.) or even provide different 
11 Traditionally in Islam, mavlud is a ritual commemorating the birth of Prophet Muham-
mad, and it should be performed during the Twelfth Day of Rabi al Awwal in the lunar calendar. 
Among the women of Fergana Valley, however, it is one of the largest and most important of 
the all-female religious rituals, and it is carried out here throughout four successive months dur-
ing different occasions, (Kandyoti and Azimova 2004, pp. 339–340). Nowadays in Tajikistan, 
such a way of performing mavlud has come under harsh criticism from orthodox Muslims. 
12 For instance, during Ramadan, every evening, a night prayer (Arabic: tarawih) takes 
place in mosques for men, sometimes also, women gather at home where they are led in prayer 
by a bibi otun.
13 (Tajik: Bibi Mushkil-kushod, Persian: Bibi Moshkel-goshā, English: Lady of Solution, 
literally – opening a problem). Mushkil-kushod is a very popular ritual among women in Central 
Asia performed to ensure the fulfillment of someone’s wishes, to find a solution to their problems 
or just ‘to clean the path’ – to make life happier. It is organized exclusively for women, mostly 
on Wednesdays, and it is conducted by an otun. The ritual is based on the old legend about 
Bibi Mushkil-kushod who helped a poor woodcutter to become wealthy, and involves reading 
the Quran, prayers, and other rituals. 
14 (Persian-Tajik: Bibi Seshanbe/Bibi Seshanba, English: Lady Tuesday). This is also a ritual 
exclusively for women conducted by an otun and performed on Tuesdays. The ritual is based 
on the legend about Bibi Seshanbe, and involves reading the Quran, prayers, and other rituals, 
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forms of healing. In some cases, otuns begin practicing as a result of a spiri-
tual vocation which is preceded by illness or a series of visions. Some of them 
are trained in the Arabic language and possess a sound knowledge of Islamic 
texts (Kramer 2006, pp. 321–322, Kandyoti and Azimova 2004, pp. 333–335, 
Gorshunova 2006, pp. 258–261, Peshkova 2009, p. 8).
Sultanova defines the conditions which should be fulfilled for a person to 
become an otun, and these are: a good family origin (preferably with a re-
ligious background), required knowledge of religion and tradition, musical/
poetic talent, good communication skills, a pleasant appearance, natural charm, 
kindness. Female leaders should also be trained by an older otun (2011: 127). 
I would also add to this list: high moral standards, honesty, a wide knowledge 
of different topics (not only associated with religion). An otun should treat her 
profession as a service to the community, so accepting expensive gifts or de-
manding substantial rewards are not acceptable behavior. She is also expected 
to have a harmonious and stable family life. Otuns should be not involved in 
gossip, disputes and quarrels. Due to better access to religious knowledge and 
education, nowadays some women who become otuns do not have the ap-
propriate religious family background; yet, with time, after reaching a certain 
level of knowledge, they can also perform rituals and teach people. However, 
the status of those who come from said/khoja families is considerably higher. 
Nevertheless, some women who gain religious knowledge through taking dif-
ferent courses or in madrasas reject the traditional rituals and practices, such as 
the importance of ancestry or traditional ways of passing knowledge on from 
teacher (ustod) to student (shogird) finalized by the traditional fotiha blessing 
during the ustod talbon ritual (Cieślewska 2014, p. 15).15 
It is difficult to make any generalizations regarding the influence of female 
religious leaders since it varies from community to community, as well as differ-
ing between rural and urban areas. Certainly, since gender division is applied in 
almost all aspects of life, it contributes to creating a homogenous women’s world 
with its own traditions and rules, which consequently shape the life of the com-
munity. Otuns function within the sphere of daily practices and traditions dealing 
with spiritual knowledge that links them with God. Because of this special ‘ac-
cess to the spiritual world’, they enjoy respect similarly to male religious leaders; 
as well as consuming special dishes including omoch (a kind of noodles that cannot be eaten by 
men). Sometimes, in ethnography, the ritual is named ‘the Central Asian version of Cinderella’. 
The main goal of performing this ritual is to provide a blessing for family matters, such as mar-
riage, pregnancy, etc., or to give thanks for wishes fulfilled. 
15 From that moment onwards, a shogird may act as an independent otun.
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however, their status (with some exceptions) is lower since, in general, imams 
possess more religious knowledge and a better Islamic education. 
Gorshunova points out that otuns have always received less remuneration 
for their services. Imams make a living from a fraction of the donations given 
by people to the mosque, while otuns derive their income from various gifts 
they receive from women (2006: 256). In the pre-revolution period, Nalivkin 
and Nalivkina gave an account that otuns were paid two times less than mul-
las for teaching children (1886: 57). According to my own observations, at 
present in Tajikistan, remuneration of otuns depends on many factors, such 
as their popularity, level of authority, place of living (rural-urban area), and – 
finally – the otun’s personal preferences. In Khujand, some otuns are said to 
demand even up to 100–150 USD and expensive gifts for attending a single 
celebration, while others are satisfied with much more modest remuneration 
or work without payment. In fact, women who request a lot of money do not 
win the respect of the people; they are frequently treated more like artistic 
performers than religious figures. This is especially the case for some otuns 
with beautiful voices, who perform different types of poems during rituals. My 
interlocutors, including otuns, strongly criticize such conduct, which in their 
opinion is ‘unworthy of religious authorities.’ There are also accounts about 
female teachers who have requested high payment for their teaching which is 
also not well received, since passing on religious knowledge should be pro-
vided free of charge or remuneration should be discretionary.16 
With regards to the role of otuns, Keller (2001) believes that religious leaders 
– both men and women – functioned as mediators and counselors in pre-revo-
lutionary Central Asia. This opinion is confirmed by Peshkova who conducted 
research in the Uzbek part of Fergana Valley at the beginning of the millennium. 
According to Peshkova: ‘Otinchalar [otuns] lead communities in three areas: 
teaching, religious practice and socio-religious advice.’ They give consultations 
based on interpretations of Islam and regarding different social and family mat-
ters, therefore contributing to shaping a community’s understanding of moral 
standards and ethical behavior (2009: 12). Sultanova identifies the role of otuns 
in a similar way: as a person who performs religious activities, conducts cer-
emonies, teaches and shapes future generations, and acts as a social authority 
(as a leader of the female community) (2011: 129). 
The findings of my preliminary research in 2010, 2012 and 2013 confirmed 
that by virtue of the fact that otuns are religious authorities and hold a high 
position in their communities, they can also act as social and religious leaders. 
16 Information gathered during research conducted in 2014.
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My current study, however, shows that the situation is much more complex. At 
present, in Tajikistan, the role of otuns is shaped by the policy of the state, as 
well as by various religious circles which are attempting to gain control over 
the faith and religious leaders. Prior to the research conducted in 2014, I had 
incomplete knowledge of the extent to which such politics influence the com-
munities, and particularly female religious professionals. 
Particularly, the ban on religious education in places other than officially 
registered religious schools has impacted the activities of many religious pro-
fessionals, including otuns. According to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan 
on ‘Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations’ (Russian: Zakon Re-
spubliki Tadzhikistan. O Svobode Sovesti i Religioznykh Obedineniakh), par-
ents are allowed to teach their own children religion at home, but organizing 
religious classes for groups is forbidden. Religious professionals who wish to 
teach religion should pass an exam which entitles them to receive a license. 
After this law was introduced, other legal measures were adapted which further 
limit religious life, particularly targeting the religious education of children. 
These include ‘Law on Parental Responsibility in the Upbringing and Educa-
tion of Children’ and an amendment to the Criminal Code against organizers of 
‘extremist religious’ education. The Parental Responsibility Law bans the en-
couragement of children to receive education in illegal schools and educational 
institutions, as well as from individual persons who do not have permission for 
such activity. People under the age of 18 are not allowed to participate in reli-
gious activities, including a limitation on attending mosque. Parents are obliged 
not to send their children abroad for the purpose of getting an education without 
the permission of state agencies. In August 2010, President Rahmon requested 
students return from foreign Islamic colleges, to prevent them being trained 
as ‘extremists and terrorists.’ In this way, the authorities banned Tajik citizens 
from obtaining a religious education in foreign countries. Nevertheless, some 
have continued education in various Islamic centers abroad, traveling there 
through Russia, but in most cases they have little chance to find employment 
in the official, religious institutions in Tajikistan after coming home (Corley 
2011; Roche 2013, p. 33). 
In July 2014, in Sughd region, not even a single madrasa was opened.17 
An interview with an official from the Department of Religious Affairs in 
Hukumat of Sughd region revealed that all of them failed to fulfill the formal 
requirements for a license. There are plans to re-open a madrasa in Khujand. 
17 In the whole country, the authorities have only allowed one madrasa in Tursunzade, near 
Dushanbe, to be opened.
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Currently, the Ministry of Education, the Committee for Religious Affairs,18 
together with representatives of religious leaders are developing the curriculum 
for religious education. Apart from religious subjects, also other courses are 
planned, to provide a comprehensive education. The congregational mosques 
(Friday mosques) have the right to organize ‘educational groups’, but according 
to the same official, most imams do not show any initiative in this area, since 
the organization of such a group requires the completion of many formalities. 
The local imams have little desire to do so since they derive income from dif-
ferent forms of activities, such as conducting various rituals during communal 
ceremonies (weddings, funerals, circumcisions, and the like), and maintaining 
a religious school is only an additional and unnecessary burden.19, 20 
As a result of the imposed restrictions, most teachers of religion (including 
otuns) have ceased to teach people or they have continued their activities in-
formally.21 There are reports of secret police raids on religious classes set up at 
private houses, with searches for illegal literature, and other forms of intimida-
tion and repression of religious activities (Mamurzoda 2011; USCIRF 2011).22 
Until June 20, 2014, the regional office of The Islamic Renaissance Party 
of Tajikistan (IRP) in Khujand, located next to the premises of the Nuri Islam 
Mosque, was the only official place in the whole Sughd region which provided 
knowledge regarding Islamic issues. There were gatherings for women on 
Tuesdays and Thursdays, during which various matters relating to Islam and 
also state legislation and policies were discussed. Unfortunately, in the mid-
dle of June, the authorities closed the IRP office, after which the building was 
18 The Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA), Kumitai Umuri Dini Tojikiston (Kumitai 
Dini) established in 2010, it operates in all region of Tajikistan. The Shuroi Olii Ulamoi Tojik-
iston (The High Council of Ulama, [Shuroi Ulamo]) operates within CRA.
19 The state administration established a salary for imams who work in the Friday mosques 
(160–400 USD), depending on the position and the mosque. In June 2014, I was told that it was 
being paid out irregularly to the imams. 
20 Information confirmed later by the local representative of the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
21 Information obtained in the years 2012 – 2014, in different places throughout the country.
22 In May 2010, the Tajik Ministry of Interior launched ‘Operation Madrassa’, targeted 
at individuals teaching Islam to children and youth without official licenses. In 2010, while 
conducting my research, I had the opportunity to attend informal religious classes for women. 
The first time, after being introduced by a friend, the bibi otun asked me to show documents to 
prove that I am a foreigner. ‘No problem,’ I answered, ‘I can show my passport.’ Finally, I was 
told there was no need to show my documents. The woman explained that they had been con-
vinced that I was a Tajik from a different region and that I worked for the secret service (KGB) 
and would monitor them; the participants stated that representatives of the state had visited them 
a few times in order to search for incriminating literature, and also to force them to cease their 
activities. In 2014, I visited the same region, and the situation has deteriorated since 2010. 
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totally destroyed. Negotiations between the party members and local authorities 
have not brought any positive results (Ferghana News Agency 2014). 
At present, there is no officially registered place which offers Islamic educa-
tion in the territory of the Sughd region. As a consequence, religious people, 
especially the young, are exposed to different influences, including those of 
an illegal/extremist character. The state officials express a lot of concern over 
the growing threat of militant Islam, but in reality they do not address the issue 
in a constructive way. Most of their actions aim at undermining the political 
opposition represented by the IRP or other potential opponents that attempt to 
express dissatisfaction with the existing order. 
The persons employed in the official institutions, and responsible for reli-
gious affairs are little known religious figures, while others (such as members 
of the IRP, and popular religious leaders) have been repressed by the state 
authorities (Epkenhans 2011 quoted within Roche 2013, p. 28). During my 
research, a number of my interlocutors confirmed that presently there is no 
significant religious figure employed in the official religious institutions in 
Tajikistan. The respected independent-minded religious leaders have been mar-
ginalized and removed from their posts. 
A lack of good teachers and religious authorities has resulted in difficul-
ties in designing adequate religious policies. Consequently, modern Islamic 
thought which could serve as a counterbalance to the radical Islamic approach 
has not managed to develop. The state administration have promoted ‘mod-
ernized traditional Islam’, ‘the correct understanding of Islam’, ‘the right 
interpretation of hadiths and Sunna’23, but have failed to formulate a satisfac-
tory concept of what this means. The general aim is to protect Tajik Islamic 
tradition but at the same time to change those elements which are consid-
ered to be pagan and pre-Islamic. These ‘non-Islamic elements’, however, 
are the distinctive characteristics of ‘traditional Islam’; their modification is 
a compromise between the idea of the purification of religion and Tajik tradi-
tion. The IRP also attempts to promote ‘the correct understanding of Islam.’24 
Most Party representatives or supporters with whom I conducted interviews 
support the idea of the purging of unorthodox elements from the religion. 
Pilgrimages to mazars, the traditional, central-Asian rituals associated with 
the life cycle, and even the Tajik female costume are being strongly criticized. 
23 Quotations from interviews with state officials (June 2014).
24 Oddly enough, during the interviews with the state officials and the IRP representatives 
and supporters, my interlocutors often used the same phrase in Russian: (Pravilnoe ponimanie 
islama) – ‘the correct understanding of Islam’; nevertheless, both parties have different views 
concerning whose approach to Islam is ‘correct.’ 
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Besides, such rituals as Bibi Mushkil-kushod, Bibi Seshanbe are being for-
bidden as bida (innovation) and even shirk (idolatry or polytheism). Despite 
the fact that some members of the Party come from the Sufi tradition, Sufism 
is also being questioned. Consequently, the traditional otuns are frequently 
shown in a negative light, and the participation of women in the rituals which 
the otuns conduct is being condemned. However, there are some modern fe-
male religious teachers, and despite their reluctance towards the social institu-
tion of otuns, frequently, they have replicated this pattern of a social female 
authority, although in a modified way. 
Currently, in Tajikistan, religion and faith have become the focal point of 
an ideological battle between the government and the IRP or its supporters. It 
seems that people of faith and their beliefs are less important than the political 
struggle which is taking place in Tajikistan. 
At this stage, Islam in Tajikistan is in a constant process of in-flux, influ-
enced by various factors which are the by-product of the civil war and the col-
lapse of the USSR. For the first time in history, the Muslims of Tajikistan have 
been cut off from the traditional centers of Islamic thought in Central Asia, 
such as Samarkand, Bukhara, and other cities located now in Uzbekistan. Dur-
ing the times of the Soviet Union, despite the state’s hostile attitude to religion, 
Islamic thoughts and ideas flowed freely across the flexible borders of the re-
publics. The political division of the region in the early 1990s and the policy 
of isolation of the new state, have contributed to the separation of Muslim 
communities. Consequently, Islam in Tajikistan has lost its ideological base 
to which it could have referred in the process of building its modern identity. 
Other relatively new ideologies have not become well established yet.
With regard to Islamic education, many people believe that the present 
situation resembles the persecution of Islam during the Soviet Union. Even 
if the above opinion is overstated, similarly as during the Soviet era, Islamic 
education has been once again pushed underground. In the 1930s, as a response 
to the policies of the Soviet state, chains of hujra (literally: room) were de-
veloped which provided Islamic teaching throughout the whole Soviet period. 
Underground schools educated students in different regions of Central Asia. 
The official madrasas led by SADUM had a low level of education (Muminov 
et al. 2010, pp. 224–250). It remains an open question whether the religious 
leaders will continue the ‘Soviet tradition’ of hujra under the current circum-
stances in Tajikistan.
It should be noted that despite similarities in the main principles of the re-
ligious policies in contemporary Tajikistan and in the Soviet Union, the ideo-
logical basis is different. At present, the authorities declare themselves to be 
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Muslims, ostensibly acting to eradicate foreign ‘dangerous’ elements from 
Islam in Tajikistan. Some citizens support this approach, feeling concern about 
the spreading of radical Islam, and consequently about the threat of an ‘Is-
lamic state’ being established. The reports from Afghanistan, Islamic State 
and other parts of the world seem to confirm this dangerous scenario, and 
the illegal activities of groups such as Hizb at-Tahrir or Jamaat at-Tabligh 
only reinforce this belief. 
In reality, however, the state is attempting to establish a mechanism of close 
supervision of religious life through developing various means of control at 
every administrative and social level. Apart from Departments of Religious Af-
fairs and branches of the State Committee for Religious Affairs in districts and 
cities, the religion itself and Muslims are being investigated by representatives 
of local administration (jamoat) and mahallas. Sometimes, there are female 
committees within these structures, but most of them do not play a signifi-
cant role. Nevertheless, authorities attempt to use them to control otuns under 
the pretense of ‘protection against Islamic extremism.’ Jamoat authorities have 
established lists of otuns. Accordingly, women are called to attend gatherings 
in jamoat, where they are asked for their cooperation, especially regarding 
family affairs and “On Re-ordering Traditions, Celebrations and Customs in 
the Republic of Tajikistan”, aimed at regulating the rules for the organization 
of and expenditures for weddings and other ceremonies (Law [2007/2008]). 
Officially, otuns are expected to talk to women during rituals and celebrations 
about limiting expenses and the number of guests invited, as well as to mediate 
in family matters. At the same time, however, they should closely observe their 
communities; those who refuse cooperation with the authorities are deprecated. 
To what extent such policies bring benefits depends on various factors related 
to the power relationships within a community, the position of a specific otun, 
and also the region of the country. 
In 2011, the hukumat of Khujand City (municipality) established the Coun-
cil of Bibi Otuns (Shuroi Bibi Otunho). According to an official from the Reli-
gious Affairs Department in the hukumat of Khujand, ‘the main goal of shuro 
is to conduct agitation and propaganda work among the particular groups of 
citizens (including otuns) to lead state policies onto the right path by introduc-
ing the correct understanding of Islam among women.’25 Presently, the shuro 
consists of about fifty-three otuns. Women are asked to join by their mahalla 
administration or are invited by the head of shuro. The shuro has still not been 
formally registered but there are plans to create a legal entity. In addition, 
25 Information obtained during an interview in June 2014.
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authorities have planned to certify otuns by organizing exams regarding knowl-
edge of Islamic issues.
In May 2014, local Khujand TV broadcasted a program entitled ‘Shuroi Bibi 
Otunho on ba khotiri chist?’ (English: What is the role of the Council of Bibi 
Otuns?), presenting and promoting the activities of the shuro. The president of 
the organization and a few otuns who are its members appeared in the program; 
also some citizens of Khujand (including scholars) were invited to participate. 
The social role of female religious leaders and their influence on society were 
discussed. Following the broadcast, the talk show was extensively commented 
on by female religious professionals as well as by other people. ‘No respect-
able religious leaders would have agreed to participate in such a show’, ‘It was 
obvious that the women appearing in the program did not say what they were 
really thinking and that everything was arranged in advance’ are examples of 
some of the things I heard during the conversations.26 
Regardless of how the program was perceived by its audience, the broad-
casted talk show demonstrates the state policies in relation to female religious 
leaders. Officially, the shuro representatives emphasize the otuns’ role in re-
solving family conflicts and other social issues, but in fact, the most impor-
tant task of this entity is to shape otuns’ views on religion and society. On 
the one hand, the government is curbing the influence of religious leaders 
through banning independent religious education, which is obviously leading 
to a lowering of the status of women religious leaders and limiting their role 
in the performance of rituals during various celebrations. On the other, the of-
ficial religious representatives attempt to promote otuns as an important voice 
in female society. In my opinion, this inconsonant approach once again shows 
the inconsistency of religious policy in Tajikistan.
The majority of female religious professionals I interviewed during my 
research were not involved in politics, and most of their activities were concen-
trated on conducting rituals, and in some cases on informal teaching. The so-
cial position of a particular leader is based on her religious knowledge, life 
experience, her relationship with a community, and often her family origin. 
Notwithstanding, even otuns with very strong authority and a good reputation 
are afraid of the secret service. Many female religious figures agreed to par-
ticipate in the Shuroi Bibi Otunho for pragmatic reasons. The recent rumors 
about the certification and registration of otuns seem to be a strong motivation. 
In one of the jamoats located in Gafurov district (Sughd region), the au-
thorities nominated a head of the otuns (Tajik: Otun Kalon, English: Big Otun). 
26 Personal talks with otuns who are not members of the shuro and other people who watched 
the show (May and June, 2014).
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According to my respondents, she does not have much authority or receive 
a lot of respect, but she follows the orders of the local administration. In 
the same jamoat, there is a head of the khodim elected by a group of ac-
tivists and approved by the authorities.27 In this way, the social leaders are 
under the supervision of the local administration. Some of my interlocutors 
expressed their opinions: ‘Those female religious professionals who attend 
meetings in jamoat and agree to cooperate are not real otuns!’ However, in my 
opinion, the social relations between female religious leaders and the authori-
ties are more complex. 
 In June 2014, I interviewed a religious figure, Fatima (42 years old), who 
simultaneously functioned as a rais of guzar (a part of mahalla). At present in 
Tajikistan, due to the high level of male migration to Russia, not infrequently 
women have taken over traditional male responsibilities, including the admin-
istration of communities. During the conversation, among other things, she 
openly admitted that a rais of mahalla recommended her to conduct agitational 
work within her community, urging young men to serve in the army. It should 
be remembered that Tajikistan’s army has a very bad reputation, and most 
parents undertake various measures, including bribing officials, to protect their 
children from being drafted into the military. It is worth mentioning that Fatima 
is a member of Shuro Bibi Otunho. Undoubtedly, she is strongly associated 
with the authorities, cooperating with them in various fields.
 In 2013, in Kurgan Tube, I participated in a Mushkil-kushod ritual per-
formed by Otun Sharofat who was also a rais of guzar. For twenty years she 
has acted as otun and community leader, which is why people selected her for 
the position of rais. For many years, Szarofat has taught religion. Presently, 
due to the ban on religious education, she has only a few students. Sharofat 
also said that through the registration of religion teachers, the authorities would 
like to intensify their control over them (including the taxation of teachers), 
and she prefers to be independent, so she would not wish to be registered even 
if she had such a possibility. 
Both cases show how ambiguous and variable the situation of religion and 
religious figures is in Tajikistan. Those otuns who do not want to agree to all 
the imposed rules have to find a way to circumvent them. It should also be 
mentioned that most religious leaders are members of local elites. Hence, many 
of them are related to authorities through various informal networks which 
influence their relationship with the administration. A good family background 
27 Khodim/Koibonu, also other names – the traditional organizer of celebrations and enter-
prises among women in mahallas. 
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can also provide protection, similarly as in the case of the activities of religious 
leaders in Soviet times.
In 2010, I met otun Adolat in Isfara, a middle-aged woman who had re-
ceived a secular university education in Soviet times and began to teach reli-
gion a few years after Tajikistan gained independence. She was a deputy (vakil) 
to the local jamoat council. In her teachings, she spreads knowledge to her 
followers about legal issues related to marriage and divorce, contraceptives, 
abortion (which she accepts by referring to sharia law), as well as other impor-
tant matters. During the interview she indicated the importance of increasing 
women’s awareness regarding their rights according to Islamic values and 
the challenges of the contemporary world. In her opinion, secular education 
as well as knowledge of Islam are significant in enabling women to advocate 
their rights. According to her, the two systems should complement each other. 
I did not have the opportunity to interview her in 2014, but I found out from 
her relatives that at present she is not a deputy to the jamoat since ‘the local 
power relations’ have changed. 
Those female religious professionals who are associated with the IRP have 
the most problematic situation. I met Mohnisso (50 years old) for the first time 
in 2010 when I was invited during Ramadan for Iftors and Tarawih prayers 
in Isfara. I interviewed her also in 2014. She comes from a respectable fam-
ily of religious leaders. Mohnisso prefers to be termed Bibi mullo rather than 
Bibi otun. A few years ago, she organized a religious circle for women who 
gathered regularly to pray or to debate various religious, theological and com-
munity matters. At present, due to pressure from the authorities, she has been 
forced to limit her activities and has stopped teaching since – as an IRP leader 
– she is under the close supervision of the secret service. Mohnisso follows 
strict Islamic rules, rejecting all traditional practices and rituals, including Bibi 
Mushkil-kushod and Bibi Seshanbe, pilgrimage to mazars, and so forth. Despite 
the governmental pressure, she is very influential not only in her mahalla, but 
also in the whole area of the jamoat where she lives. 
My research shows that religious orthodoxy strongly influences people’s at-
titudes toward Islamic practices. Especially in the bigger urban areas or religious 
regions such as Isfara, the generation of 25–40 year-olds who have access to 
the relevant religious literature often reject the otun traditions, considering them 
to be backward and non-Islamic. They believe that every person can learn how 
to fulfill the obligatory Muslim duties, so intermediaries between God and man 
are not necessary. Current trends indicate the transformation of the role of female 
religious leaders; nevertheless, otuns are still influential, especially among older 
and middle-aged generations of women who adhere to local tradition.
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CONCLUSION
Today in Tajikistan, otuns are being scrutinized by the authorities as never 
before. Previously, due to their status as informal leaders, the authorities had 
limited access to them. Shuroi Bibi Otunho, a body created at the initiative of 
the authorities, is part of the strategy aimed at controlling religious leaders. 
Even if individual otuns are not involved in politics, their actions can become 
politicized. Those who do not agree to cooperate can be shown in a negative 
light and persecuted. The state attempts to define the ‘correct understanding of 
Islam’ within ‘Tajik culture’ but still the policy in relation to religion is incon-
sistent. The main approach is that all religious leaders should adapt the modi-
fied version of traditional Islam under the state’s close supervision. 
The IRP and its supporters promote their own version of religion which 
is purified of all heterodox elements. Whatever the IRP’s motivations are 
as the political opposition, it acts in its own interests, and religion is one of 
the tools used to achieve its goals.
Both governmental policies and the influence of the IRP are contributing 
to changing the status of otuns and the perception of their role in society. 
The restrictions imposed on Islamic education may in the long term lead to 
decreasing otuns’ authority and to limiting their role in the performance of 
rituals and celebrations. 
Some people even believe that otuns no longer hold any significance in 
the society and they are invited to attend ceremonies only for prestigious rea-
sons. Proponents of the orthodox version of Islam promote the idea that tra-
ditional otuns and their rituals are incompatible with the Quran and should be 
eradicated from Islam.
Notwithstanding, many people still consider otuns an inseparable part of 
religious tradition. Rites and rituals performed by female religious figures are 
important from the point of view of maintaining community ties. Women who 
gather together during rituals have an opportunity to socialize, as well as to 
pray together, which releases them for a moment from the tensions of everyday 
life. Reading the Quran and religious parables during gatherings enriches them; 
the religious stories cited by otuns pass on moral values and teach a specific 
pattern of behavior in accordance with Islam and Tajik-Uzbek cultures. 
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